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Abstract
This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that indi-
vidual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To
empirically identify this component, we exploit variation associated with international
migration flows. We find that the environmental attitudes of migrants, while being
resilient to environmental conditions, also embed a cultural component, which persists
till the second generation migrants. Our results suggest that, in the presence of multiple
environmental problems that require collective action, comprehending the driving forces
behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical to design effective policies.
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1 Introduction
The profound effect of culture on economic outcomes and the formation of public policy has
been at the center of a recent debate that explores the transmission of cultural traits. Several
aspects of the economy and the society such as the fertility rate, female labor force participa-
tion and preference for redistribution have been argued to manifest a cultural component that
frames individual economic behavior and ultimately economic policies. In the light of major
ecological problems that require immediate collective action, several studies in Anthropology
and Sociology pointed out the reasons why accounting for cultural factors is also important in
environmental issues. Humans are self-centered and this feature is inherently anti-ecological.
Also, public beliefs and values tend to interpret scientific information on environmental
issues (e.g. on gas emissions, ozone depletion), thus affecting social preferences towards
the environment (see Plumwood, [21]; Kempton et al., [12]). These factors, by reducing
environmental awareness, are likely to undermine the design of effective environmental policies.
Also, the difficult consensus on greenhouse gas emission targets for the period 2013-2020 within
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change suggest that, besides political
or economic factors, a cultural component exists that determines a heterogeneous degree of
environmental awareness across country members.
The economic literature has so far neglected the analysis of the role of environmental
culture. To define culture is a challenging task. As R. Borofsky [5] puts it: “ we talk
about culture as something real,..., but culture is in fact an intellectual construct used for
describing a complex cluster of human behaviors, ideas, emotions and artifacts. [...] efforts to
define culture are akin to trying to encage wind”.1 This paper advances the hypothesis that
differences in environmental preferences across individuals can be traced to cultural differences.
In particular, we argue that environmental attitudes such as the willingness to pay for the
environment are not solely the effect of local environmental conditions on individual attitudes
but can also be accounted for by culture. For the purpose of this paper, we build on Guiso
et al [11], and define environmental preferences as a set of values that embodies beliefs, social
norms and attitudes, which rule individual behavior towards the environment.
Our analysis tackles this issue both theoretically and empirically. In the theoretical
part of the paper we present a model of transmission of environmental preferences based on
Bisin and Verdier [4]. We assume agents live in two separate social groups, and consume
goods whose production causes pollution. Each social group has a specific environmental
trait, defined as the dis-utility from pollution. In the absence of migration, each social group
preserves a homogeneous environmental trait, and agents in each group select consumption
levels, thus the amount of pollution, which maximizes their utility. When migration takes
place, assumingly due to income differences, first generation migrants carry their cultural
1Another related issue is how culture affects human behavior. For this see Bowles and Gintis [6].
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traits and preferences with them from their origin to the destination group. Crucially, they
now face the possibility that their offspring may acquire the cultural trait of the destination
group. Still, cultural transmission of the origin group trait may occur through two channels.
First, if individuals want their culture to prevail in the new environment they should invest in
family socialization (direct transmission). Second, the cultural transmission may take place
through socialization within the migrant group (indirect transmission). We find that the
environmental trait is successfully transmitted, either directly or indirectly, if the marginal dis-
utility from pollution of migrants is inferior to the marginal dis-utility of the native population.
This condition guarantees that the direct transmission of the environmental traits acts as a
cultural substitute to indirect transmission. This is the benchmark case examined by Bisin
and Verdier [4]. If this condition holds, the likelihood is high that the migrant children
will acquire their origin culture through indirect transmission whenever the direct vertical
socialization fails. It follows that the population in the destination country ex-post migration
will be heterogeneous, because the trait of the migrant population will survive.
The empirical analysis aims to test the broad hypothesis that environmental preferences
may be culturally transmitted to future generations. To establish our testable hypothesis we
use survey data from the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS dataset comprises 45
European countries and includes information about the attitudes, beliefs and preferences of
Europeans towards a range of issues such as the environment, religion, politics, the economy,
etc. and allows us to identify first and second generation migrants. As a measure of the
environmental preferences of individuals, we focus on the willingness of individuals to pay for
the environment.
Our empirical strategy is based on the “epidemiological” approach by Ferna´ndez [9],
which uses variation associated with international migration flows to identify the causal impact
of culture on individual preferences. The focus on immigrants allows us to distinguish the
effect of an “environmental culture” (formed and persistent in the country of origin of the
migrant), from the effect of the (economic and environmental) incentives the migrants are
exposed to in the country of destination. Our empirical approach allows us to account for the
endogeneity of culture with respect to individual environmental preferences, which prompts
a causal interpretation of our results. Our findings suggest that culture has a persistent and
statistically significant impact on the environmental preferences of migrants: differences in
environmental attitudes among migrants can be traced to a persistence of social preferences
in their country of origin. We also show that environmental attitudes are resilient to the
set of incentives that come from the external environment: the environmental conditions
migrants were exposed to in their country of origin do not have a significant impact on their
preferences in the host country. Our empirical findings are robust to a number of alternative
assumptions, and present interesting dimensions of heterogeneity. A first dimension relates
to the degree of cultural integration: migrants who appropriate some important aspects of
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the host culture (e.g. language or laws) are also more willing to retain the environmental
trait that comes from their own culture. This attitude is well known in Sociology and it
is denoted as an “integration strategy” i.e. a strong association with both the host and the
origin country (Berry [3]). A second heterogeneity dimension regards the cultural transmission
process: Immigrant’s network and family are both important cultural transmission channels;
moreover, the quality of the transmission process (e.g. measured by intra-family relationships)
plays a pivotal role, as well as the paternal (relative to maternal) influence.
Our findings have a number of important implications with respect to the formation
of public policy both at the local and at the international level. First of all, governments
should not only aim at pollution reducing policies but also at social learning activities that
foster the emergence of an environmental culture. This issue becomes even more critical in
an era where international migration flows are rather vast and therefore the cultural trait
of the median voter in a country is likely to be “a weighted average” of several different
cultures. International environmental agreements are reached by leaders who represent the
social preferences prevailing in their country. Therefore, understanding the driving forces
behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical for reaching consensus at all
levels.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the related theoretical and
empirical literature and highlights the contribution of our paper. Section 3 presents a formal
model that explores the transmission mechanism. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our study adds to a growing economics literature that analyzes cultural transmission mecha-
nisms, initiated by the seminal paper of Bisin and Verdier [4]. In the context of environmental
economics, there are few theoretical studies that explore the impact of social norms on the
environment. Sethi and Somanathan [17] study the endogenous evolution of social norms in a
local common-property resource setting using evolutionary game theory. They find that with
a sufficiently large number of individuals that are enforcers, the society can reach and remain
in a norm-guided society rather then individualistic one. Schumacher [18] investigates cultural
dynamics of environmental preferences, as in Bisin and Verdier [4], including a feedback from
pollution to cultural dynamics. Pollution affects the proportion of the two cultural traits that
exist - environmentalists (greens) and browns. The dynamic transmission is such that green
preferences are less likely to be transmitted inter-generationally for low levels of pollution,
whereas they are likely to be transmitted for high levels of pollution. Behadj and Tarola
[2] study social norms and their effect on environmental awareness. The authors consider
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consumption choices between a green and a brown product made under social norms influence:
individuals suffer if they buy a brown product when peers in their social group select a green
version. This mechanism allows to build a market demand that embodies social norms that
concern the environment. Then, the market equilibrium that arises depends on the extent
of such social norms. Authors show that brown firms could exist the market due to such
consumption externalities.
Our theoretical analysis provides a simple and intuitive mechanism via which environ-
mental culture can be transmitted across individuals. Building upon the baseline cultural
transmission model and by plausibly assuming that individuals may migrate, driven primarily
by economic incentives, we capture the conditions under which the environmental culture is
transmitted and we generate a clear hypothesis to be tested in the empirical section of the
paper. To build our theoretical prior, we use a simple version of Stokey [19] to determine
the individual choice of consumption and pollution. This choices are dictated, among other
things, by the disutility from pollution that encompasses the environmental culture of a social
group. Then, such choices are combined with the hypothesis of Bisin and Verdier [4] that
guarantees the cultural transmission of the environmental culture.
The main contribution of our paper is on the empirical side. While the idea that
culture affects economic phenomena is quite old and much debated in other fields, such as
Anthropology and Sociology, the quantitative analyses of the impact of culture on economic
outcomes start only in early nineties. Carroll et al. [7] attempts to identify a cultural
component in the propensity to save but fails to find a systematic effect of culture probably
due to the data restrictions, as admitted by the authors. More recently, Ottaviano and Peri
[15] analyze the economic value of cultural diversity in the US and finds that an increase in
the share of foreign-born citizens between 1970 and 1990 in metropolitan areas, produced a
significant increase in wage and in the rental price of housing of native US citizens.
An obvious issue in identifying the impact of culture on economic outcomes is that
past economic outcomes may determine a country’s beliefs and values as well as its current
economic outcomes. The development of large-scale survey datasets such as the World Values
Survey, or the European Surveys (ESS and EVS) favored the emergence of a literature that
tackles the endogeneity of culture relative to economic outcomes. A number of studies adopt
an instrumental variables (IV) approach. For instance, Tabellini [20] explore the impact of
culture on growth, using historical literacy rates as an instrument for culture. Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales [11] use religious denomination and ethnic origins as instruments, to identify the
impact of culture on various economic outcomes. While it allows to model the process of
cultural transmission, the IV approach relies on the strong assumptions that the instrument
(i.e. religion, ethnicity, literacy rates) affects economic outcomes only through the specific
dimension of culture at stake. Ferna´ndez [9] and Ferna´ndez and Fogli [10] propose a different
approach, which exploits variation associated with international migration flows to isolate
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the cultural determinants (that arise in the country of origin) from the local determinants
(linked to the economic conditions in the country of destination) of individual preferences.
This approach does not model the transmission mechanism from culture to social preferences,
but has the advantage of cutting the link between past and current economic outcomes.
Applying this approach, Ferna´ndez and Fogli [10] analyze the effect of culture on fertility and
female labor participation, Alesina and Giuliano [1] identify the causal impact of family ties
on economic outcomes, while Luttmer and Singhal [13] establish the cultural transmission
of preferences for redistribution. These studies proxy culture by either observed economic
outcomes in the country of origin (e.g. female labor market participation rates), or the average
set of values and beliefs in the country of origin (e.g. average preferences for redistribution,
average strength of family ties). To address concerns of selective migration, they exploit the
multilateral movements of migrants from many different origin countries to several different
host countries and focus on second generation migrants.
The present paper contributes to this expanding literature by applying this “epidemi-
ological” approach to the analysis of the cultural transmission of environmental attitudes.2
Even though we use a reduced form empirical specification a la` Ferna´ndez [9], we are able
to gain an interesting insight over some important features of the process of environmental
preferences’ determination. We are able to check whether the environmental preferences of
immigrants are formed only through cultural transmission, or whether they also respond to the
environmental conditions prevailing in the country of origin. We are also able to analyze some
aspects of the cultural transmission process, i.e. the role of cultural integration of migrants,
the type and quality of the cultural transmission as well as the relative maternal and paternal
influence.
3 The Model
Inhere, we briefly describe a model a` la Bisin and Verdier [4] to explain how environmental
preferences are transmitted. Assume two populations of individuals that in period one consti-
tute two within-homogeneous groups.3 The first group lives in a polluted environment, while
the second one enjoys a better environmental quality. Denote these two social groups as B and
G, respectively. Each population is assumed to have a specific environmental trait different
from the population of the other group. This difference in trait may have been developed
through time and the difference between the two has been augmented due to different levels
of income, different levels of technology, etc. Denote these two traits as Brown and Green.
2This approach is called “epidemiological” as it is inspired by Epidemiology. In medical sciences,
Epidemiology studies migrants to isolate the genetic from the external causes of a disease (Ferna´ndez [9]).
3A group is a generic set of individuals (a country, a village, an ethnic group), who share a common cultural
trait.
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The environmental trait can be seen as the dis-utility from pollution, which determines the
marginal willingness to pay for the environment, as defined below. A representative agent’s
utility function writes as:
u(c)− hi(p) + (PiiVii + PijVij) , i, j = G,B, i 6= j
where c is consumption and p is pollution, u(·) is the sub-utility from consumption and h(·)
captures the dis-utility from pollution. Both functions are assumed monotonic increasing. The
production of the consumption good(s) generates emissions as a by-product. We assume that
each unit of consumption good produced emits fi(c), i = B,G units of pollution. Thus,
pollution technology writes as p = fi(c), f
′(c) > 0, i = B,G. Each individual has an
endowment of income Mi, i = B,G. Neglecting for the time being the last part of the utility,
the optimal choice of consumption yields
h′i(p)
u′(c)
=
1
f ′i(p)
, i = G,B (1)
The expression
h′i(p)
u′(c) captures the marginal willingness to pay of the representative agent
for a unit reduction of pollution. The two social groups show different willingness to pay,
governed by the shape of the dis-utility from pollution hi(p). At the optimal choice, the
marginal willingness to pay is equal to the inverse of the marginal productivity of the polluting
technology. Last, by assumption, u(c)−hi(fi(c)) is a concave function c. Hence, the marginal
increase of consumption always dominates the corresponding dis-utility from the marginal
increase in pollution up to a certain level of pollution but once that level of pollution is
exceeded dis-utility from pollution exceeds utility from consumption.
The last part of the utility function, PiiVii + PijVij, concerns the cultural transmission
of the environmental trait. It captures the empathy of the representative agent for her prole,
where Vii ≡ u(c) − hi(p) is the sub-utility function of a parent of type i having a child of
type i, and Vij ≡ u(c) − hj(p) is the sub-utility function of a parent of type i having a child
of type j. Pii is the probability that a child from a family with trait i is socialized to trait i;
and Pij is the probability that a child from a family with trait i is socialized to trait j. Before
any migration takes place and assuming that mutations within an homogeneous social group
are absent, the event that a new born within a family of type i has a different trait, namely
j, never occurs, i.e., Pij = 0. This implies that families need not to invest in within-family
socialization, which is a costly activity. Let the cost of this investment, when it takes place,
be Ii(e), I
′ > 0, I ′′ > 0, where e denotes resources devoted to within-family education.
In period 1, countries are in autarchy, so no migration takes place. Then, without loss
of generality, it is assumed that the trait Green is developed in group G and the trait Brown is
developed in group B. Hence, group Green is made of individuals of type G and group Brown
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is made of individuals of type B. Our definition of types is determined by the cultural trait
(the type of function h). The level of pollution and consumption in each group is determined
by the interplay of the cultural trait G or B, income Mi and the polluting technology fi,
which are all assumed to be group-specific variables. Clearly, were income endowments and
polluting technologies the same between the groups, the level of pollution in each group will
differ only due to cultural difference, hi 6= hj.
Since before migration, the two populations are homogeneous, then family transmission
and the indirect transmission are complementary. Parents can refrain from socializing with
their descendants since the process is costly because they will acquire the trait from their
friends, hence I = 0. This is also known as the Social Conformity. The representative agent
will maximize
max
c
u(c)− hi(p) + (PiiVii + PijVij) (2)
s.t. c ≤Mi
p = fi(c)
Then, substituting these expressions in (2), the first order condition obtains again as
h′i(p)
u′(c)
=
1
f ′i(p)
, i = B,G (3)
which determines the implicit optimal solutions of consumption and pollution, c∗i (Mi) and
p∗(Mi), respectively. Notice that since Pij = 0 in the period that precedes migration, then, the
first order condition is the same as in a classical model with no intergenerational transmission
of traits (1). At the optimal choice of agents, the marginal willingness to pay to reduce
pollution shall equalize the marginal productivity of the polluting technology. As expected,
c∗i (Mi) and p
∗(Mi) depend on the shape of hi and the productivity of the polluting technology.
Assume now that in the second period, migration takes place from population i to
j, i = B,G, i 6= j. Migration takes place, as explained in the seminal paper of Roy [16],
because of income differences: Mi < Mj. Now, a fraction q
i, i = B,G of the population in
group j shows a trait i which is different from the natives’ population trait j. A child born in
the migrant family receives the same trait as the parent through the socialization within the
family with probability di(qi). If the socialization within the migrant family is not successful,
with probability 1− di(qi), then with probability qi the trait i is acquired by the socialization
in the migrant minority, and trait j with probability qj = 1 − qi. Then, a child of a migrant
family shows the trait of his family with probability di(qi), when the trait is acquired at home,
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plus (1− di(qi)) qi, when the trait is acquired within the migrant minority. Hence,
Pii = di(qi) + (1− di(qi)) qi.
Then, a second generation migrant will not show the same trait as his family with probability
Pij = 1− Pii.
After migration, the migrant families, with trait i, maximize the following utility
function
max
e
u(c)− hi(p) + (PiiVii + PijVij)− Ii(e) (4)
s.t. c+ e ≤Mj
p = fj(c)
The first order condition now obtains as
(1 + Pii(qi))h
′
i(p) + Pij(qi)h
′
j(p)
u′(c)
− I
′
i(e)
u′(c)
1
f ′j(p)
=
2
f ′j(p)
(5)
When facing an heterogeneous population, at the optimal choice, the marginal willingness
to pay for the environment of a migrant of type i changes with respect to the marginal
willingness to pay if he had stayed in his own group. This change occurs even though his
cultural trait hi(p) remains the same. After migration, a migrant’s marginal willingness to
pay for the environment encompasses the effect of pollution on the utility of the child whether
he is of type i or j. Secondly, part of the resources is now devoted to within-family education.
Furthermore, the migrant family now receives a different income and finally, she recognizes
that the polluting technology is different. This first order condition gives the implicit solutions
c∗i (Mj, qi), p
∗(Mj, qi) and e∗(Mj, qi). Bisin and Verdier [4] show that if the optimal level of
investment e∗(Mj, qi) depends negatively on qi, then, the trait is successfully transmitted. In
the current setup, we can claim the following
Proposition 1 Environmental preferences are successfully transmitted either directly or in-
directly from one generation to the other and thus environmental preferences have a cultural
component if the marginal dis-utilities from pollution satisfy the condition h′i(p)− h′j(p) < 0.
Proof. Totally differentiating the first order condition (5) with respect to e and q,
yields:
de∗
dqi
= − f
′
j(c) [d
′(qi) ∗ (1− qi) + (1− d(qi))]
[
h′i(p)− h′j(p)
]
2u′′(c)− (1 + Pii)
[
h′′i (p)f
′
j(c) + h
′
i(p)f
′′
j (c)
]− Pij [h′′j (p)f ′j(c) + h′j(p)f ′′j (c)]− I ′′
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Since the denominator is negative for the concavity condition of the utility function with
respect to e, then, the sign of de
∗
dqi
is given by the sign of h′i(p)− h′j(p). If h′i(p)− h′j(p) < (>)0
then de
∗
dqi
< (>)0 !
Discussion The above proposition will form the basis of our testable hypothesis,
i.e., whether differences in environmental attitudes can be traced to differences in cultural
attitudes. In the light of the fact that cultural differences can hardly be measured we cannot
test all the implications of the proposition therefore we will focus primarily on establishing
the presence of a cultural component in environmental attitudes.
Nevertheless our theoretical findings are interesting in several dimensions and thus
merit some additional analysis. The proposition shows that the level of investment in family
socialization depends crucially on the difference in marginal dis-utility of pollution hi versus
hj, i, j = B,G, i 6= j. If the destination group is characterized by individuals with a very
high marginal dis-utility from pollution, then the higher the flow of migrants, the lower the
investment of families in within-family socialization because children will obtain the trait from
indirect transmission.
Two remarks are in order. First, the condition h′i(p) ≷ h′j(p) does not imply that the
level of dis-utility from pollution of individuals in group i is higher or lower from the dis-utility
from pollution of those in group j. It can well be that individuals in j suffer more pollution
with hi(p) < hj(p), and vice versa. The condition in Proposition 1 determines a relationship
between the marginal dis-utility from pollution at the optimal level of pollution in the group
j.
Second, totally differentiating the first order condition for c, we find that dc
dq
< 0 iff
h′j(p) > h
′
i(p) holds. Hence, the higher the flow of migrants qi, who will transmit their trait
successfully (as established in Proposition 1), the lower the level of the pollution pj produced
in the destination country by migrants as compared to the level of pollution they would have
produced if they had stayed at the origin country. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that
the optimization of the native representative agent of group j is similar to (4) . It follows
that migration can determine a decrease of the level of pollution in the destination social
group depending on the elasticity of the demand for consumption. More precisely, this can
happen if the total decline of the per capita consumption ( dc
dq
< 0) dominates the increase of
consumption demand due to migrants arrival.
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and empirical strategy
In this section, we estimate the impact of culture on environmental preferences, using data
from the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS is a large scale cross national survey, and
currently has four waves spanning over the period 1981-2008. We focus on the 2008 wave of the
EVS, 4 because this is the only one that traces back first and second generation immigrants.
We exclude all people who do not provide information about their country of origin, their
parents’ country of origin, and who are under the age of 18. We also exclude observations
for which environmental preferences or any other individual control are missing. We obtain a
final sample of 2855 migrants coming from the 45 countries. Of those migrants, 1674 are first
generation migrants whereas 1181 are second generation migrants.
In line with our theoretical analysis, we proxy environmental preferences by individuals’
willingness to pay for the environment. The EVS includes an ordered variable, which measures
the extent of agreement to the statement “I would give part of my income if I were certain
that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution”. The variable takes the
value of 1 for “strongly disagree”, 2 for “disagree”, 3 for “agree” and 4 for “strongly agree”.
We follow the recent empirical literature on the economic effects of culture (Luttmer
and Singhal [13], Ferna´ndez [9], Ferna´ndez and Fogli [10]) and estimate the following reduced
form specification for immigrant preferences:
MWPirb = β ∗MWP b + γ ∗Nitrousb + δ ∗GDPxcb + λ ∗Xi + θr + irb. (6)
MWPirb denotes the marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for the environment of
immigrant i, who lives in country r and originates from country b. We follow the literature and
define the immigrant’s country of origin b as the country of origin of the father.5 MWP b is the
mean value of the MWP for the environment, measured among natives only, in immigrant i’s
country of origin b. Nitrousb are Nitrous Oxide emissions (in logs) in immigrant i’s country of
origin b. This environmental indicator is a good proxy for environmental quality in the origin
country for a number of reasons. Nitrous Oxide gas emissions have a huge environmental
4This 2008 wave includes the maximum number of countries. There are 42 countries in the sample: Albania,
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. In addition
to these there are data on immigrants from former Czechoslovakia, USSR and Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal
Rep.). See Appendix A for details.
5In the results’ section we check the robustness of our results against alternative definitions of country of
origin, based on the country of origin of the mother. We also discuss extensively the role of father and mother
in the cultural transmission mechanisms.
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impact (with a Global Warming Power 300 times superior than CO2; see EPA, [8] for details),
and reflect primarily local (as opposed to trans-boundary) pollution, and over the 40% of
emissions are triggered by human behavior. Also, the level of gas emission can be considered
as a “stock” pollution variable (Nitrous Oxide survives in the atmosphere for over 100 years),
thus it is a good proxy of the pollution that the migrants faced when they left the country.
Among the controls, we include per capita GDP in the country of origin, GDPxcb, a
vector of extensive individual, spouse, and parental characteristics, Xi, and a fixed effect for
the residence country of immigrant i, θr. Finally, irb denotes the error term.
Our coefficients of interest is β. If the preferences towards the environment of the
immigrant were only affected by the relevant economic and institutional factors in her country
of residence, we should expect β = 0. However, a β significantly different from 0 signals
an effect of culture on the environmental preferences of the immigrant. The identifying
assumption in equation (6) is that there are no omitted factors correlated with environmental
preferences in the origin country other than culture that affect immigrant’s preferences in
the country of destination. Based on this assumption, estimates of β by ordinary least
squares (OLS) can be given a causal interpretation (Ferna´ndez [9], Luttmer and Singhal [13],
Ferna´ndez and Fogli [10]). We discuss below the validity of our identifying assumption.
Endogeneity issues. A number of endogeneity issues may arise in a specification such as
equation (6), and render OLS estimates of β biased and inconsistent. A first potential issue is
selective migration, if workers with strong preferences for the environment can migrate from
high polluted countries to low polluted ones.6 We argue that selective migration is not a
problem in our estimates for three reasons. First, as pointed out by Luttmer and Singhal [13],
selective migration is generally not an issue in ESS and EVS type of survey data, as these
data consider migration flows from multiple countries and to multiple destinations. Second,
environmental migration flows are generally triggered by long term trends such as increases
in droughts or flooding, which may reduce livelihoods in certain areas, particularly those
based in agriculture (see e.g. Martin, [14]). These events are of limited relevance in our
sample, which only includes flows between countries characterized by relatively homogeneous
climatic conditions. Table 1 describes migration flows, and conveys the idea that international
migration flows in our sample mostly take place between Southern and Northern European
countries or between Eastern and Western European countries. As an example, Poland is an
important origin country (see Columns (1)-(4)). It accounts for 83 migrants to 24 different
destinations, the most common one being Germany (14 migrants with Polish origin reside in
6Notice that selective environmental migration from high to low polluted countries would imply that the
MWP for the environment of migrants is systematically higher than the average MWP of natives in the origin
country. In this case, environmental migration is likely to impose a downward bias to the estimated impact of
culture on individual preferences, which implies that our estimates would provide a lower bound of the true
effect of culture on migrants’ individual preferences.
11
Germany). Conversely, Switzerland is an important destination country (see Columns (5)-(8)).
This country hosts 186 migrants coming from 22 countries, with the prevalent origin country
being Italy (39 migrants of Italian origin from our sample currently live in Switzerland). This
descriptive evidence is consistent with the view that migration flows are mostly determined by
income differences. Selection is economically motivated selective migration. This argument is
enough to rule out selection for environmental preferences provided that lower income countries
are not necessarily the more polluted ones.7 Third, we also look at the impact of culture on
environmental preferences of second generation migrants. Following Ferna´ndez and Fogli [10],
the focus on second generation migrants provides a tool to minimize selective migration, their
migration status being determined by parents’ migration decision, thus being exogenous with
respect to their environmental preferences.8
There is a second issue of omitted variable bias in so far as other factors than culture,
e.g. low unobserved skills, determine both the migration status (for example unemployment,
low income or segregation in the country of origin) and the marginal willingness to pay for the
environment. Table 2 reports the demographic characteristics of the sample of migrants, and
confirms that unobserved individual characteristics could be a concern, as over the 30% of
migrants in the sample only have primary education, and over 50% are females, which may be
particularly subject to segregation issues. Following Luttmer and Singhal [13] and Ferna´ndez
and Fogli [10], we assume that the extensive set of individual, family, parental and spouse
characteristics available in the data fully captures the effect of such unobserved factors. We
also carry out an extensive set of robustness checks to control for any omitted factor which
may confound our baseline estimates.9
There is third issue of simultaneity, potentially due to economic conditions in the
country of origin, which may determine both the regressors and the dependent variable. We
account for it by adding controls for the economic performance and environmental conditions
in the country of origin (per capita GDP, Nitrous Oxide emissions). A final concern is reverse
causality, which may be triggered by feedback effects from migrants’ to natives’ preferences.
This is also not a concern in our sample, due to the absence of massive flows of return migration
in the data. However, we account for this by dropping from the sample all return migrants
(i.e. individuals born abroad but resident in the country of birth of their father). 10
7It is well-known that income and pollution across countries follows a non-monotonic relationship known
as the Kuznets curve. Hence, it is likely that migrants move for income reasons and often they live behind
cleaner countries to reside in more polluting ones.
8Notice that the focus on second generation migrants also allow to attenuate other endogeneity issues,
e.g. omitted individual characteristics, correlated with the migration decision, or exposure to non-cultural
characteristics of the country of origin, which may also affect migrants’ preferences. See below for a discussion.
9Omitted variable bias is also likely impose a downward bias to the estimated impact of culture on individual
preferences, as long as individuals with low unobserved abilities tend to report relatively lower MWP for the
environment.
10An alternative way to address the issue of return migration, would be computing the average preferences
of natives, around the time migrants left the country (see e.g. Ferna´ndez and Fogli [10]). This would also
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4.2 Empirical Results
Table 3 reports estimates for the impact of culture on immigrants’ MWP for the environment.
The analysis is undertaken for the full sample of migrants (Columns [1]-[4]), the sample of
first generation migrants (Columns [5]-[6]), and the sample of second generation migrants
(Columns [7]-[8]). In column [1] we only include the host country dummies. In column
[2], we add controls for income in the country of origin (measured by the log of purchasing
power parity adjusted GDP in 2000) as well as relevant demographic, socio-economic and
household characteristics (i.e., age, age squared, gender, education, employment status, indi-
vidual income, marital status, having children). In column [3], we enrich the set of individual
controls by adding dummy variables for parental and spouse characteristics (i.e. education,
employment status, occupation). The coefficient of the mean MWP in the origin country is
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the native culture has a positive impact
on migrant’s attitudes. In particular the estimates suggest that one unit increase in the mean
level of the marginal willingness to pay for the environment at the origin country is associated
with a 0.21 increase in the index of the MWP of the migrant.
Column [4] further explores whether this effect is triggered by the origin culture or
whether it is driven by the environmental conditions in the origin country. In particular, we
run a horserace regression between the mean MWP for the environment and environmental
quality in the country of origin (Nitrous Oxide emissions, in logs). Results in column [4]
confirm the estimated impact of our cultural variable remains largely unaffected, whereas the
local pollution variable is insignificant. 11
[Table 3 here]
In columns [5]-[6] and columns [7]-[8], we report separate estimates for the first and
second generation immigrants respectively, while employing the full set of controls (columns
[5] and [7]) and running the horse-race regressions between pollution at the origin country
and mean attitudes at the origin country (columns [6] and [8]). The coefficients of mean
environmental attitudes in the country of origin remain positive and highly significant for
both immigrant categories. In particular, the positive and significant coefficient for the second
generation immigrants is reassuring as to the fact that a cultural transmission mechanism is
at work, and that the results are not driven by selective migration. Also in these estimates
the coefficient on pollution does not confer any significant effect on immigrants’ preferences.
allow us to identify more precisely the cultural channel. Unfortunately, migration identifiers are only available
for the 2008 EVS wave, so we had to use contemporaneous preferences of natives. However, as stressed by
Fernandez and Fogli [10], contemporaneous preferences are also a good cultural proxy. In fact, cultural traits
present a very persistent component, which is embedded in social preferences and manifests itself at each point
in time. Moreover a weaker cultural channel captured by the contemporaneous cultural trait implies that our
estimates actually estimate a lower bound of the true effect of culture on migrants’ preferences.
11Our results remain qualitatively robust to the use of past values of the pollution variable.
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As our main variables of interest are ordered indicators obtained by survey responses,
it is useful to have an insight over the size of the estimated impact of culture on individual
preferences. Overall, results in Table 3 indicate that one standard deviation increase in the
mean MWP for the environment in the country of origin is associated with a 0.04− 0.08 unit
increase in immigrants’ MWP for the environment i.e. 5%−10% of one standard deviation of
immigrants’ MWP (compare Table 2). These figures are non-negligible considering that they
are obtained coeteris paribus i.e. all other individual, host and origin country characteristics
being the same.
Turning to controls, individuals with secondary or tertiary education have stronger
environmental attitudes as compared to individuals that only completed primary education,
while unemployment experience adversely affects the willingness to pay. Among the individual
controls, age, gender and income do not have a significant impact on individual MWP. The
log of purchasing power parity adjusted GDP in the origin country, which is meant to capture
economic differences across countries is not statistically significant.
We subject our baseline analysis to a number of sensitivity exercises. We first check
whether our results are robust to the adoption of alternative specifications. We then check
that our results are not driven by omitted individual attitudes, such as trust, altruism, or
political views. We finally turn to some heterogeneity exercises, which allow us to get some
insight over some relevant characteristics of the cultural transmission process.
4.2.1 Alternative Specifications
Table 4 establishes the robustness of our results for first and second generation migrants to
the use of alternative specifications. To expositional purposes, we report only the results for
the coefficient of interest. The ordered variable used in our baseline specification, mixes the
extensive margin of the willingness to pay for the environment (agreement vs. disagreement)
with the intensive margin (strong vs. weak agreement or disagreement). It may be argued
that the extensive margin is the most relevant one from a cultural point of view, as it better
measures social adherence to an environmental norm. Thus, in Rows [1] and [2], we isolate the
extensive margin by recoding the ordered MWP variable into a binary variable, which takes
the value of 1 if individuals “agree” with allocating part of their income for the environment
and 0 otherwise. A similar approach is adopted for the construction of the mean MWP in the
origin country. Using the binary variables, we replicate the baseline analysis. Results suggest
that a 1 p.p. increase in the average number of people willing to pay for the environment in
the country of origin is associated with about a 0.2 p.p. increase in the probability that an
individual migrant would be willing to pay for the environment in the host country.12 With
12Notice that estimated coefficients from the Probit model (Row [2]) do not measure marginal effects, thus
are not directly comparable with those from the linear probability model (Row [1]).
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respect to the baseline specification, the significance of the coefficients is somewhat reduced,
which suggests that some part of the cultural transmission process is associated with the
intensive margin, thus not captured by probability models.
Our baseline specification includes an extensive set of parental and spouse character-
istics, to control for the confounding role of any individuals’ unobserved factors. In Rows [3]
and [4] we get some insight over the direction of the bias imposed by these confounding factors
by excluding from the baseline specification parental and spouse characteristics, respectively.
Results for first generation migrants are unaffected, which suggests that unobserved individual
characteristics do not provide a significant source of bias for our baseline estimates. Conversely,
the coefficient of the average MWP in the country of origin becomes not significant after
the exclusion of the spouse controls from regressions on second generation migrants. This
suggest that there are unobserved features of second generation migrants described by the
characteristics of the spouse (e.g. low abilities, or social segregation), which are also negatively
correlated with their marginal willingness to pay for the environment.
Finally, while our baseline specification includes host country dummies to control for
local environmental and economic conditions, there might be other relevant geographical
dimensions associated with the host country, such as the region or the city level. Thus,
in Row [5] we replace the host country dummies with fixed effects for the NUTS1 region of
residence, while in Row [6] we add dummies for the size of the city of residence. Our results
remain intact, confirming the persistent effect of the origin culture on environmental attitudes.
[Table 4 here]
4.2.2 The Role of Individual Preferences
The MWP for the environment can be affected by a multitude of other factors besides
environmental awareness such as trust, political orientation, or altruism. As these factors
may also display a cultural component, not accounting for them may induce a false evidence
of cultural transmission of environmental preferences. In Table 5, we address this concern and
add to the baseline specification a number of controls for additional individual attitudes. In
panel a, we report results for first generation migrants, while in panel b we report results for
second generation migrants.
In Columns [1]-[3], we address the issue whether our results are driven by an altruistic
motive and add a dummy equal to 1 if an individual belongs to an environmental organization,
0 otherwise (column [1]), a dummy equal to 1 if an individual served some unpaid work for
environmental organization, 0 otherwise (column [2]), and a dummy equal to 1 if an individual
never served any unpaid work, 0 otherwise (column [3]). The estimated impact of culture
remains largely unaffected. Also, results point to a strong impact of altruism on immigrants’
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MWP for the environment. Migrants that belong to environmental organizations and work
unpaid for the environment (particularly second generation), are more willing to spend money
on the environment, while lack of unpaid work for any organization has a negative significant
impact on the MWP of first generation migrants.
In Column [4], we investigate the role of political views, and add a dummy for left-
wing orientation. Also in this case, the estimated impact of culture on immigrants’ MWP
is unaffected. Left-wing political orientation is not significantly correlated with the MWP of
first generation migrants, while it displays a positive association, significant at the 1% level
with the MWP of second generation migrants.
In Column [5] and [6], we check whether our results are driven by lack of either
generalized distrust, or distrust for environmental organizations. Also in this case, the impact
of culture on immigrants’ MWP survives, despite of the strong negative impact of distrust
measures one the MWP of both first and second generation immigrants.
Finally, in Column [7] we introduce the full set of attitudes. The significance of the
impact of the MWP in the origin country reduces somewhat, yet it still confirms the presence
of a cultural effect. Results also confirm that lack of altruism and trust reduce immigrants’
MWP for the environment.
[Table 5 here]
4.3 Heterogeneous Features of Cultural Transmission
The reduced form nature of our empirical specification makes it difficult any direct inference
regarding the features of the cultural transmission process. In this section, we try to gain some
insight over this issue, by studying whether the effect of culture on environmental preferences
differs, depending on a number of factors i.e. the degree of cultural integration of migrants,
the type and quality of the cultural transmission process, and the role played by parents in
the transmission of the cultural trait.13
4.3.1 Cultural Transmission and Integration of Migrants in the Host Country
We start by exploring whether our findings on the transmission of cultural attitudes manifest
heterogeneity driven by differences in the integration process of immigrants in the host country.
While it does not include direct questions about individual integration in the home country’s
culture, there are useful information in the EVS to reconstruct this information. The first
is host country’s citizenship. Due to the prevalent application of the “Ius Sanguinis” in
13Notice that we carry out these heterogeneity exercises for the entire pool of migrants. In fact, distinguishing
between first and second generation would entail a too big reduction of the number of observations available
in each cell.
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European countries, an immigrant has to fulfill very strict terms to acquire the citizenship of
the host country e.g. by marriage, or naturalization. Furthermore, acquiring the host country’s
citizenship has a high opportunity cost e.g. in terms of time and requirements devoted to
comply all bureaucratic procedures, while relatively limited benefits to immigrants.14 This
suggests that immigrants who acquire the citizenship of the host country have some intrinsic
motivation, which stems from a cultural integration process.
A second important feature is immigrants’ own judgment over the possibility of becom-
ing integrated in the host country’s culture. The EVS includes a number of questions that go
in this direction. Immigrants are asked whether they consider “speaking the host language”,
“having lived long in a country”, “respecting a Host Country’s Law” important ways to
share a country’s national culture. An affirmative answer to each of these questions implies
a positive judgment over the possibility that immigrants who comply with the linguistic,
temporal, or civic dimension may become integrated in the host country’s culture. We argue
that such subjective beliefs are good predictors of immigrants’ integration effort as well as the
effectiveness of their cultural integration process. The EVS also includes a question on whether
“having a country’s ancestry” is an important way to share a country’s national culture. An
affirmative answer to this question by immigrants implies their negative judgment over the
possibility to be culturally integrated in the host country: if ancestry is the relevant dimension
to acquire a country’s national culture, cultural integration may never occur, besides any effort
to comply with the linguistic, legal, or civic norms of the host country.
We explore whether the effect of MWP in the origin country on individual MWP differs
among immigrants, who are heterogeneous in each of the five dimensions of cultural integration
specified above i.e. (i) having a host country’s citizenship, (ii) attaching importance to
speaking the host country’s language, (iii) attaching importance to having lived long in
the host country, (iv) attaching importance to respecting the host country’s laws and (v)
attaching importance to having host country’s ancestry. To construct the heterogeneous
effects of MWP in the origin country, for each dimension (i)-(v) we construct two “yes” and
“no” dummy variables, which we interact with the MWP in the origin country. We thus obtain
two (heterogeneous) effects: the first is the average effect of MWP in the origin country for
those who do hold the host country’s citizenship or consider the specified dimension (ii)-(v)
important to share the host country’s culture, while the second measures the average effect
for those who do not hold citizenship or consider the specified dimension (ii)-(v) unimportant
to share the host country’s culture.
14This argument applies to intra-EU immigrants, which are the majority in our sample. EU citizenship is
granted to all citizens of a EU member state, regardless of their country of residence. This argument does not
apply to EU immigrants coming from the 13 countries in our sample, which are not involved in the process
of European integration i.e. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Georgia, Iceland,
Kosovo, Moldova, Macedonia, Russia, Serbia, Turkey. Immigrants from these countries still enjoy substantial
benefits (e.g. in terms of free mobility) from getting citizenship of a EU country.
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We report results of this set of regression in Table 8. Rows [i]-[v] correspond to single
regressions, where the direct homogeneous effect of MWP in the origin country is replaced by
the two heterogeneous effects in each of the dimensions described above. For each regression,
we also report the p-value on a test of whether the two coefficients in each regression are
equal. Estimates in Row [i] suggest that the effect of culture on environmental preferences
is concentrated on citizens, with the difference in the cultural transmission process between
citizens and non citizens being significant at the 5% level. Also, size and statistical significance
of the coefficients estimated in Rows [ii]-[iv] suggests that migrants who attach importance
to speaking the host country’s language, to having lived long in a country, or to respecting a
country’s law are the most affected ones by their origin culture (even though in these cases
the p-values do not reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal).
All these results indicate some form of complementarity between environmental culture
and cultural integration in the host country: the culture of origin is very important for
migrants who are more integrated in the country of destination. Migrants who are more
respectful of the host country’s culture and ready to appropriate some aspects of it are also
more willing to transmit the most relevant traits of their own culture. This is at least the case
for the environmental traits. In Sociology, this attitude is documented as the “integration
strategy” i.e., a strong identification of the migrants to both the host and the origin country
(Berry, [3]).15 Finally, notice that estimates in Row [v] suggest that migrants who attach
importance to ancestry are similarly affected by their origin culture as immigrants who do not
attach importance to it. This result provides some indirect support to our complementarity
hypothesis: being ancestry clearly beyond immigrants’ control, it is not a relevant dimension
to evaluate their effort in cultural integration.
[Table 6 here]
4.3.2 Type and Quality of Cultural Transmission
We now turn to the analysis of whether our baseline results manifest any heterogeneity with
respect to some characteristics of the cultural transmission process. First, in the theoretical
model we stressed that cultural transmission may occur either through family socialization
(direct transmission) or through socialization within the migrant group (indirect transmission).
While distinguishing the two channels is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper, the
EVS provides information that allow us to further explore whether these two channels are both
15The result that the integration process in the host country does not necessarily entail a cultural
assimilation, which weakens the native cultural traits is somewhat surprising and certainly interesting.
Ferna´ndez [9] comes to a somewhat different conclusion with respect to female labor market participation.
A possible way to reconcile the two views is that the immigrant may follow the “integration strategy”, only
when the cultural trait in the country of origin does not conflict with the set of economic incentives, which
prevail in the country of destination.
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at work in our estimates. Second, immigrants may be subject to adverse family situations
(e.g. parents’ divorce or death), which may reduce the quality of the cultural transmission
process. The EVS also includes a number of questions that allow us to investigate whether
the effect of MWP in the origin country on individual MWP differs among immigrants, who
are heterogeneous in terms of the quality of the cultural transmission they underwent. As in
the previous case, to construct the heterogeneous effects of MWP in the origin country, we
construct for each relevant dimension two “yes” and “no” dummy variables, which we interact
with the MWP in the origin country. We then replace the homogeneous effect of MWP in the
origin country by the corresponding heterogeneous effects in each of the relevant dimensions.
We report results of this new set of regression in Table 9, Rows [1]-[7]. As in the
previous set of estimates, in each row we report estimates of the two heterogeneous effects, as
well as the p-value on a test of whether the two coefficients in each regression are equal. As for
the type of cultural transmission, our results confirm that both the direct and indirect channel
are operating: the effect of culture on environmental preferences is concentrated on individuals
that consider friends important (Row [1]), as well as on individuals that consider that family is
important in life (Row [2]). As for the quality of cultural transmission, our estimates suggest
that family relations play an important role: the effect of culture on environmental preferences
is concentrated on individuals whose father likes following the news (Row [4]) and individuals
who did not experience parents’ divorce (Row [6]), in this case the heterogeneous effects being
even significant at the 5% level. These findings suggest that families characterized by both
external commitment (i.e. towards the society as a whole) and internal commitment (i.e.
towards other family members) are more successful in the transmission of cultural traits.
Finally, the effect of culture on environmental preferences is also concentrated on individuals
who experienced father’s death (Row [7]), the heterogeneous effects being significant at the 5%
level. This may indicate that offspring value more parents’ teachings after their death. It may
also indicate increasing returns from the time spent with the father: individuals who have lost
their father are also those who have spent more time with him, as probably the father died
at a late age. No significant heterogeneity is envisaged in the other quality dimensions of the
cultural transmission process i.e. father’s pleasure of reading books (Row [3]), and occurrence
of political discussions with the father (Row [4]).16
Table 7 here
16Notice that in this section we evaluate the quality of cultural transmission looking at father’s side as our
baseline definition of culture is based on the country of origin of the father. Below we also check the robustness
of our results against alternative definitions of culture based on the country of origin of the mother.
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4.3.3 The Role of Parents for Cultural Transmission
We finally turn to the role of parental transmission and establish the robustness of our results
to alternative specifications where culture is based on different definitions of the country of
origin of the migrant.
In Table 8, Panel [A], we present to comparative purposes the results from the baseline
specification, i.e., the one where the definition of culture is based upon the country of origin of
the father (compare with Table 4, Column [4]). In Row [A.1] we retain a definition of culture
based on the country of origin of the father, but allow for heterogeneous effects of father’s
culture, depending on whether the mother is born in the host country or not. There appears
to be no heterogeneous effect in this dimension. The same is true in Column [A.2], where we
allow for heterogeneous effects of father’s culture, depending on whether the mother is born
in the origin country (of the father) or not. The interpretation of these results is that the
transmission mechanism of the paternal culture is rather strong and independent of the effect
of the maternal culture.
Table 8 here
This does not imply though that the maternal culture does not matter for the trans-
mission of cultural traits. To explicitly explore this hypothesis, in Table 8, Panel B we test the
robustness of our results when we use a specification where culture is defined by the country
of origin of the mother. Reassuringly, the results suggest that even in such a specification
our main findings are confirmed. Interestingly though, the point estimate in panel B (0.130)
is lower than the point estimate in panel A (0.210) confirming that the paternal culture is
stronger than the maternal culture. This result is further reinforced in row [1.B] where we
explore the presence of a heterogeneous effect driven by the fact that the father comes from the
origin country (of the mother). The results suggest that the effect of culture on environmental
preferences is concentrated on individuals whose father come from the country of origin (of
the mother).
5 Conclusions
Fertility rate, female labor participation, or preference for redistribution are cultural attributes
that frame individual economic behavior and ultimately economic policies. As part of culture,
these traits are transmitted across generations from parents to children. Are environmental
preferences among these cultural traits? This is the main question we tried to answer in this
study.
We first presented a model of transmission of environmental preferences following Bisin
and Verdier [4]. We defined the environmental cultural trait as the dis-utility from pollution,
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which ultimately determines the marginal willingness to pay for the reduction of pollution.
Agents live in two homogeneous social groups whose populations mix if migration takes place.
We found that under certain assumptions the environmental trait is successfully transmitted
to the next generations.
Then, we empirically tested our theoretical result using survey data on environmental
preferences for 45 European countries. We found that the average environmental preference
in an immigrant’s country of birth has a large and significant effect on her own environmental
preference. More importantly this results persists till the second generation of migrants
thereby confirming that cultural attitudes are partly driven by a cultural component. The
analysis is then extended to capture heterogeneous effects. A first interesting finding is that
as far as environmental attitudes are concerned, immigrants in our sample seem to adopt
an “integration strategy”, i.e., they identify themselves with both the host and the home
country. As to the type of cultural transmission both networks and family play a role in
the transmission of cultural traits. In the context of the family transmission though, the
paternal influence is stronger than the maternal influence. Our empirical findings are robust
to a number of alternative assumptions and specifications.
Knowing whether environmental preferences are part of culture improves our knowledge
about the status quo of environmental policies and of international economic agreements. As
a matter of fact, the difficulties in finding a consensus on greenhouse gas emission targets
for the period 2013-2020 could partly reflect the fact that country members of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change manifest highly heterogeneous attitudes
towards environmental protection. Similarly in the context of the national policies our findings
highlight the fact that the degradation of environmental quality is not sufficient into triggering
a shift in the environmental culture. Government should not only adopt policies aimed at
improving the environmental quality but also adopting policies that target at changing the
culture of individuals towards the environment. According to our findings they have a more
direct effect and they persist longer.
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Table 2: Sample Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Number of Mean Standard Min Max
Obs Deviation
MWP for the Environment 2855 2.751 0.881 1 4
Mean MWP for the Environment (Origin) 2855 2.676 0.289 2.115 3.377
Age 2855 47.556 16.611 18 95
Secondary Educational Level 2855 0.492 0.500 0 1
Primary Educational Level 2855 0.339 0.474 0 1
Monthly Income Household 2855 6.868 1.015 3.203 9.211
Female 2855 0.566 0.496 0 1
Notes: European Value Study (EVS), 2008.
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Appendix A Variable Definitions and Sources
Appendix A.1 EVS Variables
Main definitions and variables of interest
Individual Marginal Willingness to Pay for the Environment. Respondents are given the
statement ”I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one
read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? I would
give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental
pollution”. The variable takes values from 1-4 with 1 denoting ”Strongly Disagree”, 2-”Disagree”,
3-”Agree” and 4-”Strongly Agree”.
Mean Marginal Willingness to Pay for the Environment (Origin Country). The variable
is constructed by computing the mean marginal willingness to pay at the origin country. Migrants
are excluded from the sample. Moreover individual weights are taken into account. Respondents are
given the statement ”I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each
one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? I
would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental
pollution”. The variable takes values from 1-4 with 1 denoting ”Strongly Disagree”, 2-”Disagree”,
3-”Agree” and 4-”Strongly Agree”.
In our sample there are some migrants that declare as country of origin (or parental origin)
countries that do not currently exist in the same format. In these case we have assigned to them the
mean value of the marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for the environment of the political successor
of the origin country. Migrants coming from Czechoslovakia are assigned the mean MWP of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Migrants coming from Kosovo are assigned the MWP of Albania.
Migrants coming from the Soviet Union are assigned the mean MWP of Russia. Migrants stating
that they come from the German Democratic Republic are assigned the mean MWP of Germany.
Migrants denoting that they are of Yugoslavian origin are assigned the MWP in Serbian. Return
migrants i.e. migrants born in a foreign country but resident in the country of origin of the father
are excluded from the sample
First Generation Migrants. First generation migrants are identified using the question ”Were
you born in [COUNTRY]?”. The variable is binary with 1 denoting ”yes” and 0 denoting ”no”.
Second Generation Migrants. Second generation migrants are identified using the questions
”Was your father/mother born in [COUNTRY]?”. The variable is binary with 1 denoting ”yes” and
0 denoting ”no”
Origin Country. To identify the origin country of the first and second generation migrants the
following questions are used ”In which country was your father (mother) born?”. The migrant is
associated with his father’s (mother’s) country of origin.
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Country of Origin: other controls
Income per Capita. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population.
GDP (current 2000%$) is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. The data
comes from the 2000 World Development Indicators dataset.
Nitrus Oxide Emissions. Nitrous oxide emissions is measured as thousand metric tons of CO2
equivalent. It measures emissions from agricultural biomass burning, industrial activities, and
livestock management. The data comes from the 2000 World Development Indicators dataset.
Individual Controls
Age. The age of the respondent.
Female. A binary variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is a female and 0 if the individual
is a man.
Education. Education is an ordered variable taking values from 1-3 with 1 denoting ”tertiary
completed”, 2 denoting ”secondary completed” and 3 denoting”primary completed”. The same
classification is used for the controls of paternal, maternal and spouse education.
Income. Denotes the monthly household income (x1000), corrected for ppp in euros
Employment Status. The employment status of the respondent is a categorical variable taking
values from 1-4 as follows: 1-”full-time”, 2–”part-time or self-employed”, 3-”not participant (student,
hw, retired, other)”, 4-”unemployed”.
Occupation Status. The occupation status of the respondent is a categorical variable taking
values from 1-4 as follows: 1-”managers, professionals, technical wks” 2-”clerks” 3-”service” 4-”skilled
manuals” 5-”unskilled”. The same classification is used for the controls of paternal, maternal and
spouse education.
Marital Status. The marital status of the respondent is categorical variable taking values from 1-3
classified as follows: 3 ”married”, 2 ”divorced/separated/widowed” and 1 ”single”.
Child. Child is a binary variable taking the value 1 if there is ”at least one child in the household”
and 0 otherwise.
Employment Status. The employment status of the respondent is an ordered variable taking
values from 1-4 as follows: 1 ”full-time” 2 ”part-time or self-employed” 3 ”not participant (student,
hw, retired, other)” 4 ”unemployed”.
Town Size. The variable denotes the town size in thousand inhabitants classified as follows: 1-
”below 5”, 2-”5-20” , 3-”20-100” ,4 -100-500” ,5-”over 500”.
Years Since Migration. Denotes the year since the migrant moved to the host country.
Individual Preferences Controls
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Belong to Environmental Organization. The variable is derived from the question ”Do you
belong to an environmental organization?”. The variable is binary and takes the value 1 if the
answer is ”yes” and 0 otherwise.
Work Unpaid for the Environment. The variable is derived from the question ”Do you work
unpaid for the environment ”. The variable is binary and takes the value 1 if the answer is ”yes”
and 0 otherwise.
Work Unpaid for any Organization. The variable is derived from the question ”Do you work
unpaid for any organization? ”. The variable is binary and takes the value 1 if the answer is ”yes”
and 0 otherwise.
Trust. The variable is derived from the question ”Do you think most people can be trusted or one
can’t be too careful? ”. The variable is binary and takes the value of 0 if the answer is ”most people
can be trusted” and 1 if the answer is ”cannot be too careful”.
Left-Right Orientation. The variable is constructed based on the question ”Which political party
would you vote for? Left/right scale”. The variable takes values from 1-10 with 1 denoting ”left”
and 10 denoting ”right”.
Distrust in Environmental Organizations. The variable is derived from the question ”Please
look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great
deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? Environmental Organizations”. The variable takes
values from 1-4 with 1 denoting ”A great deal”, 2-”quite a lot”, 3-”not very much” and 4-”None at
all”.
Heterogeneity
Citizenship. A binary variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is a citizen of the host
country and 0 otherwise.
Importance Attached to Speaking the Host Language. The variable is derived from the
question ”Some people say the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY].
Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? To be able
to speak [THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE]”. The variable takes values from 1–4 with 1 denoting
”Very Important”, 2-”Quite Important”, 3-”Not Important”, and 4-”Not Important at All”.
Importance Attached to Having a Country’s Ancestry. The variable is derived from the
question ”Some people say the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY].
Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? To have
been born in [COUNTRY]”. The variable takes values from 1–4 with 1 denoting ”Very Important”,
2-”Quite Important”, 3-”Not Important”, and 4-”Not Important at All”.
Importance Attached to Having Lived Long in a Country. The variable is derived from
the question ”Some people say the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY].
Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? To have
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lived for a long time in [COUNTRY]”. The variable takes values from 1–4 with 1 denoting ”Very
Important”, 2-”Quite Important”, 3-”Not Important”, and 4-”Not Important at All”.
Importance Attached to Respecting a Host Country’s Law. The variable is derived from
the question ”Some people say the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY].
Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? To respect
[COUNTRY]’s political institutions and laws”. The variable takes values from 1–4 with 1 denoting
”Very Important”, 2-”Quite Important”, 3-”Not Important”, and 4-”Not Important at All”.
Importance Attached to Friends. The variable is constructed based on the question ”Please
say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life. Friends and Acquaintances”. The
variable is classified as follows: 1-”very important”, 2-”quite important”, 3-”not important”, 4-”not
important at all”.
Importance Attached to Family. The variable is constructed based on the question ”Please say,
for each of the following, how important it is in your life. Family”. The variable is classified as
follows: 1-”very important”, 2-”quite important”, 3-”not important”, 4-”not important at all”.
Father Reading Books. The variable is constructed based on the question ”When you think about
your parents when you were about 14 years old, could you say whether these statements correctly
describe your parents? My father liked to read books”. The variable is classified as follows: 1-”yes”,
2-”to some extend”, 3-”don’t know”, 4-”no”.
Occurrence of Political Discussions with Father. The variable is constructed based on the
question ”When you think about your parents when you were about 14 years old, could you say
whether these statements correctly describe your parents? I discussed politics at home with my
father”. The variable is classified as follows: 1-”yes”, 2-”to some extend”, 3-”don’t know”, 4-”no”.
Father’s Pleasure about Following the News. The variable is constructed based on the question
”When you think about your parents when you were about 14 years old, could you say whether these
statements correctly describe your parents? My father liked to follow the news”. The variable is
classified as follows: 1-”yes”, 2-”to some extend”, 3-”don’t know”, 4-”no”.
Experience a Parent’s Divorce. The variable is derived from the question ”Did you even
experience a parent’s divorce? ”. The variable is binary and takes the value 1 if the answer is
”yes” and 0 otherwise.
Experience a Father’s Death. The variable is derived from the question ”Did you even experience
a father’s death? ”. The variable is binary and takes the value the value 1 if the answer is ”yes” and
0 otherwise.
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Table Appendix B.1: Classification of Migrants
(1) (2) (3)
Country of Origin All Migrants First Generation Migrants Second Generation Migrants
Albania 32 28 4
Armenia 35 20 14
Austria 17 8 8
Azerbaijan 50 36 14
Belarus 98 60 38
Belgium 74 53 21
Bosnia-Herzegovina 153 95 56
Bulgaria 21 14 6
Croatia 67 42 24
Cyprus 2 2 15
Czech Republic 33 17 3
Czechoslovakia 6 3 9
Denmark 20 11 6
Estonia 9 3 14
Finland 33 19 30
France 93 63 12
Georgia 30 18 56
Germany 168 107 61
Great Britain 54 14 9
Greece 29 14 15
Hungary 46 15 31
Iceland 4 3 1
Ireland 7 7 0
Italy 160 70 90
Kosovo 16 8 8
Latvia 13 6 7
Lithuania 24 13 11
Macedonia 29 9 20
Moldova 15 8 7
Netherlands 35 25 10
Norway 6 4 2
Poland 83 46 37
Portugal 155 119 36
Romania 50 34 16
Russia 592 335 257
Serbia 87 56 31
Slovakia 54 32 22
Slovenia 13 5 8
Spain 41 22 19
Sweden 15 9 4
Switzerland 3 1 2
Turkey 195 87 108
USSR 8 4 4
Ukraine 165 95 70
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Rep. 14 9 4
Notes: The table presents the number of migrants coming from each EVS country.
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